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The Dhow as Cultural Icon 
 
By Erik Gilbert 
 
A person strolling through Zanzibar’s historic Stone Town would hardly be able to walk ten 
minutes without running into a dhow reference of some sort. There is a Dhow Palace Hotel 
that was, until the opening of the Serena, the island’s most posh hotel. There are “Dhow” 
restaurants. Shops catering to tourists sell dhow tee shirts and post cards and models of 
dhows exhibiting varying degrees of workmanship. One of the dive shops takes its customers 
out in a motor dhow. The new House of Wonders Museum has as its centerpiece a full size 
dhow, which is surrounded by numerous models of other vessels and displays about the 
history of maritime trade in East Africa. The biggest cultural event of the year in Zanzibar is 
the Dhow Countries Festival, a cultural event that includes music, dance, visual arts, and 
films that derive from the countries of the western Indian Ocean rim.  
Farther north in the Kenyan city of Mombassa, the Tamarind Restaurant runs a 
nightly cruise around the harbor in a dhow that has been fitted out as a floating restaurant. 
Tourists in Mombassa often visit the dhow harbor. On the island of Lamu the preferred way 
to get to the beach is to hire a small dhow to carry you across to the island of Manda, where 
you can have a drink at the Manda Beach Club whose bar (Fig. 1) is inside the hull of a 
dismasted dhow set in concrete.  
 
 
Figure 1.  The Manda Beach Club in Lamu, Kenya where the hull of a jahazi serves as 
the bar. 
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Map 1.  The Western Indian Ocean. 
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This fascination with dhows extends beyond East Africa to the Persian Gulf. In Oman 
the dhow is omnipresent—dhows turn up in coffee table books, yacht basins, and even in a 
traffic circle (or roundabout) in Muscat. In the old trading city of Sur, the city fathers have 
created a public plaza in which they have placed a huge, two-masted vessel (Fig. 2) and 
several smaller ones. The Omani Ministry of Culture sponsors research on dhows and has 
subsidized the publication of one of the best coffee table books about them. In Kuwait, 
wealthy businessmen from families with historic connections to maritime trade have paid for 
elaborate models of dhows to be constructed and sent to museums in Muscat and Zanzibar. 
The Emir of Sharjah has donated a collection of photographs (and a photocopier) to the 
Zanzibar National Archives, most of which are historic photos of dhows and the Zanzibar 
waterfront. 
 
 
Figure 2.  A ganja that serves as the centerpiece of a public display of Omani sailing 
ships in the port city of Sur. 
 
This romanticization of dhows within the western Indian Ocean is a relatively new 
phenomenon and contrasts with earlier perceptions of dhows in the region and in the West. In 
the remainder of this paper, I will examine nineteenth- and twentieth-century views of dhows 
(focusing primarily on Zanzibar) and the associations they carried with those that have 
emerged in the final decades of the twentieth century and the early years of this century. 
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Furthermore, I will argue, the current nostalgia for the dhow and their promotion as cultural 
heritage by governments represents a change in how elites in the region perceive the cultural 
geography of their world. The dhow serves as an icon (at least in the current romantic view) 
symbolizing the oceanic connections between the lands of the western Indian Ocean. For 
some coastal East Africans the dhow symbolizes their links to Arabia, Persia, and India, and 
allows them a degree of cultural and historical separation from Africa. In the Gulf, the dhow 
represents a past when Arab wealth came from more glamorous endeavors than selling oil, 
and in the case of Oman, a time when the nation was a regional power. Omani imperial 
power and Kuwaiti mercantile wealth both derived from their regional connections to Africa 
and India. So in the Gulf, as in East Africa, the use of the dhow as a cultural symbol is 
indicative of a new (or perhaps revived) notion of the western Indian Ocean as a place. 
The New Thalassalogy and the Western Indian Ocean 
The publication of the book The Corrupting Sea, by Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell 
in 2000, along with their subsequent work, has revived interest in the notion of seas as 
historical units of analysis. Their book was a study of the Mediterranean Sea, which tried to 
bring a more rigorous theoretical approach to the consideration of the region than did 
Braudel. Similar ideas were expressed in a work by Martin Lewis and Karen Wigen, The 
Myth of Continents, which challenges the use of continents as historical units of analysis, 
advocating for other regional units of analysis including oceans. Recently Karen Wigen 
served as guest editor for a three-article roundtable called “Oceans of History” in the 
American Historical Review that took as its topic the New Thalassology (a term devised by 
Horden and Purcell). In addition to an introductory article by Wigen there were pieces on the 
Pacific, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean. Curiously, the Indian Ocean did not make it into 
the roundtable. In her introduction Wigen noted that the use of oceans as historical units of 
analysis was fundamentally anachronistic. She further contends that the idea of oceans as 
historical places is fundamentally a social construct imposed by outsiders and that “basin 
thinking [conceiving of oceans as places] is a product of high imperialism.” These etic 
notions of oceans or basins conflict, according to Wigen, with emic conceptions of the sea. 
“Indeed, a good part of the drama of oceanic history lies in the clash between indigenous and 
outsider discourses.”1  
The idea that the Indian Ocean has a history that connects the lands on its rim is 
hardly new. From the pioneering work of Auguste Toussant and K.N. Chaudhuri to more 
recent work by Michael Pearson, Ashin Das Gupta, Sugata Bose, and Kenneth McPherson, 
the Indian Ocean is treated as a valid historical unit of analysis, though there is a great deal of 
disagreement as to where to draw the spatial and temporal boundaries of the ocean.2 Beyond 
                                                
1 Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, The Corrupting Sea (Malden, Mass. and Oxford, UK: Wiley, 
John & Sons, 2000). Martin Lewis and Karen Wigen, The Myth of Continents, (Berkeley, Cal.: University of 
California Press, 1997). Karen Wigen, “Introduction to Oceans of History,” American Historical Review 111, 3 
(2006). 
2 Auguste Toussaint, History of the Indian Ocean, (Chicago: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966); K.N. 
Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987); 
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the occasional examination of the names that different people applied to the ocean in the past, 
there has been little consideration of whether the historical coherence of the region (that 
scholars now take almost for granted, though it is customary to begin these books with a 
chapter justifying treating the Indian Ocean as a region) has been apparent to the people 
living in the region. If the friction between the etic and emic conceptions of the sea has been 
central to the literature on the Pacific and Atlantic, it has been largely absent from the 
literature on the Indian Ocean. I contend that the current wave of nostalgia within the region 
for the dhow and the maritime heritage of the western Indian Ocean represents and parallels 
an emerging emic notion of regional unity. This emic conception is largely consonant with 
scholarly notions of regional coherence.  
What Is a Dhow? 
Though I have used the word dhow liberally in the first pages of this paper, it is not a term I 
am entirely happy with. The use of the word “dhow” to denote a category of ships seems to 
be as much a social construct as “basin thinking,” and it too has its origins in high 
imperialism. The earliest use of the word dhow I have been able to find can be attributed to 
two officers in the Royal Navy, Captain Smee and Lt. Hardy. In 1811, while visiting 
Zanzibar, they observed: 
Two ships, two snows, three ketches, 21 dows, 15 bugalas, four dingeys, ten small 
boats of sizes, besides a variety of country boats constantly arriving and departing, 
and two large boats building.3 
What is interesting about this use of the word is that it is clearly intended to define a 
particular type of vessel rather than a family of vessels. Fifty years later, bagalas or bugalas 
would be considered to fall into the broader category of “dhow,” but Smee does not seem to 
have a word (or perhaps even a concept) to define this group. Rather, he lists types: ship, 
ketch, snow, dow[dhow], bugala, etc. To Smee, the ships of the western Indian Ocean did not 
seem to have a collective category into which they could be placed. They were just ships like 
any other.  
By the middle of the nineteenth century this had changed. The term dhow had come 
to embrace a whole host of vessels used in western Indian Ocean trade. Bagalas, bedans, 
jalboots, kotias, ganjas, jahazi, sambuks, mtepes, and more were all classified as dhows. One 
sees this usage in the memoirs of Royal Navy officers and in official regulations where the 
                                                                                                                                                  
Michael Pearson, The Indian Ocean (London: Routledge, 2003); Ashin Das Gupta and M.N. Pearson, eds., 
India and the Indian Ocean, (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1987); Sugata Bose, A Hundred Horizons, 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006); and Kenneth McPherson, The Indian Ocean (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998). 
3 Captain Smee and Lt. Hardy, “Observations during a Voyage of Research on the East Coast of 
Africa.…” in Appendix III of R.F. Burton, Zanzibar: City, Island, and Coast, (London: Tinsley Brothers: 1872) 
Vol. II. 
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more legal sounding word “native vessels” is substituted for dhow, though the term embraces 
the same large group of vessels.4  
The ships that fell within this new designation comprised a highly varied group of 
vessels. The term dhow was used to describe vessels as different as the double-ended, sewn-
hulled, square-rigged mtepe and the transom-sterned, lateen-rigged, nailed-hulled bagala. It is 
hard to think of much that these two vessels would have in common with each other, other 
than their reliance on wind and the use of wood in their construction. But clearly, to the 
British they did have something in common, and that seems have been their “otherness.” The 
one unifying quality these boats had in the age of high imperialism was their “nativeness.” 
When the slave trade suppression effort was at its height in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the instructions to naval officers took the tautological approach to defining their 
quarry and declared that a native vessel was a vessel that “presented the outward appearance 
of native build or rig,” or it was a vessel that was “manned by a crew of whom the captain 
and the majority of the seaman belong by origin to a country having a sea-coast on the Indian 
Ocean,” either condition satisfying the law. In other words a “native vessel” was either a 
native vessel or it was a vessel full of natives.5  
What is interesting about this definition is that British Naval officers appear to be 
exhibiting the sort of “basin thinking” that Wigen predicts that they should. They have 
lumped together, for no reason that is immediately apparent from their physical form, vessels 
from around the western Indian Ocean rim. Ships built by Indians, Africans, Arabs, and 
Persians all were defined as dhows. Occasionally one sees a western observer puzzled that 
there is no Arabic or Swahili term for “dhow,” but this seems to be attributed not to the 
artificiality of the category, but rather to the perversity of the Arabic language.  
Thus, by the late nineteenth century, western observers had created a notion of the 
dhow—a family of vessels they saw as characteristic of a region that had a cultural continuity 
that was implied by a common maritime heritage. At the same time, however, there is no 
evidence that the people who used these vessels, either as sailors or merchants, saw them as 
having any common properties. It is also noteworthy that many people who owned dhows or 
used them to ship goods also owned or shipped goods on vessels that would not be so 
categorized. The Sultans of Oman and Zanzibar had long maintained fleets of western 
warships and merchant ships alongside vessels that the British would describe as “native.” 
This caused an interesting problem in 1892, when the HMS Blanche detained and tried to 
claim as a prize the SS Kilwa, a steamer belonging to the Sultan of Zanzibar, on the grounds 
that it was transporting slaves (these were slaves traveling as passengers between Zanzibar 
and its sister island Pemba). The Captain of the Blanche argued that because the Kilwa was 
owned by a native (the Sultan) and crewed by natives (Zanzibari Arabs) it was a native vessel 
and hence subject to search and seizure by the Royal Navy. Clearly, however, steamships 
                                                
4 G.L. Sullivan, Dhow Chasing in Zanzibar Waters (London: Frank Cass, 1968 [1873]) and P.H. Colomb, 
Slave Catching in the Indian Ocean (London, New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969 [1873]). 
5 Admiralty, Instructions for the Guidance of Captains and Commanding Officers of Her Majesty's Ships of 
War Employed in the Suppression of the Slave Trade (London: H.M.S.O., 1892) vol. 1, 104-105. 
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were not meant to fall into the category of dhow/native vessel, they lacked the essential 
otherness needed to qualify, and the Blanche was not allowed to keep its prize. 6 
The Dhow in the 19th Century 
If dhows are now the objects of romantic nostalgia, in the nineteenth century they were seen 
in a diametrically opposed light. The British disparaged dhows as primitive, unsafe, 
inefficient, outside the law, and an obstacle to progress and modernity. What Arabs and 
Africans thought of their ships is difficult to say, though at least one drawing provides a bit 
of evidence.  
When Richard Burton, whose bellicose personality perhaps made him a more extreme 
example than the typical Briton of the time, made his Haj in 1853 he traveled down the Red 
Sea to Jeddah in a dhow. He hated it. He disliked the crowding, his fellow passengers, and 
the ship itself. He thought the standard of seamanship among Arab sailors was poor and 
considered their refusal to sail by night in the reef-choked waters of the upper Red Sea 
evidence of cowardice rather than prudence.7  
For the Royal Navy, the dhow carried the taint of its association with the slave trade. 
During the nineteenth century the British steadily chipped away at the Indian Ocean slave 
trade. The Moresby lines of 1839 effectively ended the legal slave trade to India, though 
there does not seem to have been effective enforcement of the ban at sea. The Hammerton 
lines of 1845 further restricted the slave trade from East Africa, limiting the legal trade to the 
movement of slaves with the Sultan of Zanzibar’s dominions in East Africa 8 Even then the 
ban was not effectively enforced; in part because it was the East India Company’s navy that 
was charged with enforcing it. Indian Navy captains who captured alleged slavers at sea were 
relieved of their commands during the adjudication process and put on half pay. Not 
surprisingly few of them troubled to capture slavers.9  
In the 1860s public awareness of the slave trade in East Africa grew as the works of 
abolitionists like David Livingstone fanned outrage about the continued collection of slaves 
in the interior of Africa for export to the Gulf and to the Americas. Just how extensive the 
export trade was is a hotly debated topic. Most historians consider that the actual number of 
slaves exported from East Africa to the Gulf was small (3,000–5,000 per year) and that most 
of the slaves taken in East and Central Africa ended up on plantations or as domestic servants 
on the coast, which was legal at the time.10 However, Britain felt compelled to extend the 
naval patrolling that had effectively suppressed the slave trade in the Atlantic to the western 
Indian Ocean.  
                                                
6 The Zanzibar Gazette, 12 October 1892. 
 7 R.F. Burton, Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah (1893; reprint, New York: 
Dover, 1964), 186–95. 
8 Abdul Sheriff, Slaves, Spices and Ivory in Zanzibar (London: James Currey, 1987), 36. 
9 Zanzibar National Archives (ZNA), AA3/20, Rigby to Bombay, 14 May 1861. 
10 Sheriff, Slaves, Spices, 39, puts the numbers as low as 1,000 p.a. in 1831. 
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In the early 1860s responsibility for slave suppression in the Indian Ocean passed 
from the Indian Navy to the Royal Navy. Royal Navy officers pursued their quarry under 
very different rules than did their Indian Navy counterparts. Not only did they retain their 
commands while adjudicating their captures, but they were allowed to burn captured ships 
they deemed unseaworthy and adjudicate after the fact. This placed a serious temptation 
before them. If they scrupulously followed the rules and took the first ship they captured to a 
port of adjudication—Aden, Bombay, or Zanzibar—they would either have to fight the 
monsoon to get to the port of adjudication or to get back to their cruising grounds. Most of 
the Royal Navy officers claimed that if they did this they would make just one capture a 
season. If however they determined each of their captures to be unseaworthy and burned 
them at sea, they could stay on their cruising grounds for the entire monsoon. Better still, 
many dhow owners were unwilling to travel all the way to a port of adjudication to argue 
over a vessel that had already been burned at sea. As a further incentive to burn, the prize 
money awarded for captured slavers was partially based on the dimensions of the vessels. It 
was much easier to exaggerate the dimensions of a burned ship than an intact one. In at least 
one instance a vessel captured and burned at sea was salvaged by its owner and brought to 
Zanzibar. John Kirk, the British consul, had it measured and found that it was substantially 
smaller than its captors had claimed during the adjudication.11  
As a result of these policies there was an explosion of slave ship captures in the 
western Indian Ocean in the 1860s and 1870s. This was partly a function of the new rules and 
increased surveillance. But the large number of captures was also a result of how slaves were 
transported. Unlike the Atlantic trade where slave ships typically carried slaves as their only 
cargo, the typical vessel captured by Royal Navy patrollers carried only a handful of slaves. 
Because the volume of the trade was low, and prior to the 1860s enforcement of the ban on 
the long-distance slave trade had been so haphazard, there were few vessels that specialized 
exclusively in the transportation of slaves. Rather, slaves were usually part of a mixed cargo. 
A vessel carrying grain, ghee, ivory, or mangrove wood might also have four or five slaves 
on board. Furthermore, many of the crewmen were slaves and it was often difficult to tell 
who was a slave being transported for sale and who was just a slave crewman, which in most 
cases was considered legal.  
The result was a general perception among the British that dhows were always slave 
ships. Interestingly, the first efforts to define dhows legally are to be found in the rules of 
engagement that were issued to officers on the slave patrols.12 Because no European nation 
would allow its vessels to be treated as high handedly as dhows were by the anti-slave trade 
patrollers, the types of vessels that could be treated this way had to be delineated in their 
orders. Ultimately the origin of the notion of the dhow as a category of vessel seems to derive 
from the anti-slave trade efforts of the nineteenth century. Note the title of one of the classic 
                                                
11 ZNA AA1/9, Foreign Office to Kirk, 8 August 1872. 
12 At least this was so in an African context. Because so much British policy in East Africa was modeled 
on Indian precedents, I would not be surprised to find that there were earlier definitions of native vessels in 
Indian law. 
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accounts of the slave trade suppression effort—Capt. Sullivan’s memoirs are titled Dhow 
Chasing in Zanzibar Waters, where “dhow” seems to be synonymous with “slave ship” 
Not surprisingly, Royal Navy officers did not see their quarry in a romantic light. To 
them, dhows were foul smelling (they were particularly offended by the shark oil used to 
treat planking and to waterproof caulking), poorly maintained, and primitive. They seem to 
have been particularly perplexed by mitepe (sing. mtepe), the sewn boats used on the East 
African coast. In at least one instance a Royal Navy ship that had captured an mtepe left it 
tied off to their stern overnight. The next morning they found it had foundered, and were 
shocked to learn that an mtepe required round the clock bailing or it would sink.13  
The association between dhows and the slave trade was solidified further by the 
Brussels Convention of 1890. This treaty urged its signatories to effectively occupy their 
African territories in order to end the slave trade within the continent. The treaty called for a 
number of measures restricting the flow of arms into the continent, building railways so as to 
end the alleged use of slaves as porters, and so forth. As part of this effort colonial regimes 
were required to use a uniform system for registering dhows and controlling their 
movements. All the registration data was to be collected in Zanzibar (data were collected for 
several years) by the International Maritime Bureau. The purpose of this was to ensure that 
dhows were not used to carry slaves. While the collection of centralized data quickly fell by 
the wayside, the registration formats, passenger lists, and such that were dictated by the 
treaty are still being used by postcolonial governments in East Africa.  
 The nineteenth-century slave trade suppression efforts and the Brussels Convention 
left the dhow firmly associated with the slave trade in the colonial mind. While the world of 
sailing ships is frequently romanticized, there is no romance in the slave trade, something 
that is as true of the Atlantic slave trade as it is of the Indian Ocean.  
Slavery lurks in the background of any discussion of the dhow as heritage or cultural 
icon. If the association between dhows and the slave trade has diminished in the twentieth 
century, it lingers for some Africans. As we shall see later on, that association affected the 
role of dhows as heritage well into the twenty-first century. In the minds of many Africans, 
dhows (especially big ocean going vessels) are still associated with the slave trade. In the 
Gulf, Oman especially, the opposite is the case and the slave trade is rarely publicly 
associated with dhows.  
Colonial 20th Century 
In the early twentieth century Britain extended its control over the western Indian Ocean. By 
the end of the First World War, India and much of the East African coast belonged to the 
British. Aden and, to a lesser extent, Hadhramaut were theirs too, while Muscat and the 
Trucial States were dependant on British support. As a result the British were able to act 
upon their distaste for the dhow. They enacted a number of policies that were meant to push 
the dhow out of certain market niches and invested heavily in infrastructure needed by 
steamships. This created the impression (not entirely accurate) that the dhow trade was in 
                                                
13 ZNA AA12/8, Wilson to Secretary of the Admiralty, 10 November 1861. 
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decline. Associated with this notion of decline were the first glimmerings of the romantic 
view of the dhow in European writings. At the same time, what little evidence there is about 
regional attitudes toward the dhow suggest that Arabs and East Africans were buying into 
British antipathy toward dhows.  
In the nineteenth century the dhow’s negative connotations derived from its 
association with slavery. In the twentieth century the taint of slavery remained, but by the 
1920s, the main problem with dhows was that they were “primitive.” British economic 
planners were anxious to modernize and rationalize. For maritime trade this meant the use of 
steamships and the concentration of trade through a few major ports with rail links. Dhows 
were much less dependant on the major ports, making it harder for authorities to ensure that 
produce was inspected and taxed before export. Even more annoying was the fact that local 
merchants, when faced with a choice between shipping on steamers and on dhows, preferred 
the latter for some routes and cargoes.  
The result was several efforts to encourage and even to force merchants to use 
steamers for some purposes. The best example of this was the Zanzibar Clove Crisis of 1937. 
In that year the British banned the use of dhows in the transport of cloves within the Zanzibar 
Protectorate. This precipitated a year long boycott of the clove trade by Zanzibar clove 
merchants and ultimately they regained the right to use dhows in their businesses.14  
At the same time that the colonial state was acting to limit the use of dhows for 
coastal trade, they were becoming increasingly apprehensive about the effects of the long 
distance trade between south Arabia and the Gulf and East Africa. Aden of course had 
steamer services to East Africa, but almost all the contact between the Oman and the Gulf 
and East Africa was through the dhow trade. Until the late 1950s East Africa was 
significantly more prosperous than much of the Gulf, and each dhow season brought 
thousands of economic migrants to East Africa. Colonial governments worried about the 
health and the character of these immigrants. They also disliked the disruptive presence of 
large numbers of dhow sailors in the ports during the dhow season. Colonial officials shared 
information about conflicts between dhow crews as the fleets proceeded down the coast. 
Since the terminus for most Arab dhows was Zanzibar conflicts that had begun in more 
northerly ports often ended up being played out in Zanzibar.  
In Zanzibar the newspapers were full of complaints by residents about the trouble 
caused by dhow crews and admonishing the government to do something to control them. 
Prior to each dhow season there would be meetings and plans were drawn up to deal with any 
flare-ups of violence. At one of these meetings Sheikh Bagurnah, a Zanzibar dhow agent, 
advised a colonial official that the sailors were “ignorant … the countries they come from 
were still backward [and] they therefore regard this country’s laws as mere botheration.”15  
Neither colonial officials nor most Zanzibaris saw anything romantic about dhows. 
To the British they were primitive and an obstacle to modernization. To Zanzibaris they were 
                                                
14 Erik Gilbert, Dhows and the Colonial Economy of Zanzibar (Oxford: James Currey, 2004), 105–107. 
15 ZNA AK4/35, “Dhow Agents Meeting held in the office of the District Commissioner, Urban,” 27 
October 1962. 
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economically necessary, but still a source of annual annoyance as their crews filled the city 
for months. It is at precisely this moment that the romanticization of the dhow begins. Allan 
Villiers was an Australian sailor, writer, and filmmaker who was trying to document the last 
days of working sail. To him, dhows, like any other sailing ship, were romantic. Just before 
the Second World War he managed to join a Kuwaiti dhow in Aden headed for Zanzibar. He 
spent the whole season with them traveling as far south as the Rufiji Delta and then made the 
return journey to Kuwait. The book he published about this experience presents dhows 
sympathetically and to a degree sees them as a sort of heroic survival of an ancient tradition. 
He admired the seamanship of the Kuwaitis he sailed with and more or less extended the 
romantic affection he had evinced for other types of sailing ships in his other books to 
dhows. Villiers’ account of the voyage fits into a broader genre of travel literature that 
romanticized the Arab world, in his case focusing on the sea rather than the land like 
Thessiger and Philby had. Villiers’ book was followed by a number of other treatments of the 
dhow trade, some of them lavishly illustrated coffee table books.16 
At the same time that dhows were being romanticized in the West they were 
increasingly falling out of favor (at least for the long distance trade to Africa) within the 
Indian Ocean world. The number of dhows making the voyage to East Africa stayed fairly 
strong in the 1950s and then dropped off precipitously in the 1960s. This had two main 
causes. First, the growth of the oil economy meant that sailors could make more money 
working close to home in the oil fields than they could making the dangerous and 
uncomfortable voyage to East Africa. Second, decolonization in East Africa led to an 
emphasis among the new nations of the region on their African identities at the expense of 
the Oceanic identities. “Basin thinking” was rejected as a legacy of colonialism and African 
nationalism and Pan-Africanism won the day. 
Nowhere is this latter phenomenon more apparent than in Zanzibar. The revolution of 
1964, just months after formal independence, led to a total reorientation of Zanzibari politics 
and a rejection of all things Arab. The African nationalist and rhetorically Marxist 
revolutionaries who seized power in Zanzibar sought to build links to the mainland and to 
China and the Soviet block, not to the nations of the Indian Ocean rim. One way of 
undercutting those links was to ban the arrival of any vessel that had entered an Arab port in 
the preceding twelve months.17 This prevented all Arab, most Persian, and many Indian and 
Pakistani dhows from entering Zanzibar. By the 1970s the anti-Arab policies of the 
revolutionary government coupled with a general impoverishment of the islands, led to an 
exodus of Arabs and Indians. Most of the Arabs who were able to leave ended up in Muscat, 
laying the foundation for a future revival of connections between the Gulf and East Africa.  
The 1970s represent the nadir of “basin thinking” in East Africa and a low point in 
the perception of dhows by states in East Africa. If dhows were associated with slavery and a 
primitive economy in the 1930s, in the 1970s the postcolonial regimes of East Africa saw 
them as equally primitive, but also as potential agents of political and economic subversion. 
                                                
16 Allan Villiers, Sons of Sindbad (London: Scribners, 1940). 
17 ZNA AK18/13, “Mkutano Hususi Unaohusu Majahazi ya Musim,” 6 June 1965. 
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The government of Zanzibar passed a series of laws targeting the use of dhows in the 
smuggling of people and cloves (the island’s main cash crop) out of Zanzibar.  
In revolutionary Zanzibar and to a lesser extent in the rest of East Africa, the question 
of dhows and slavery arose again. The party that ruled Zanzibar, the Afro-Shirazi Party (later 
known as the CCM after it merged with the ruling party on the Tanzanian mainland) saw 
itself as the champion of “African” Zanzibaris. The Afro-Shirazi Party’s constituents were 
for the most part the descendants of slaves. To them, the dhow was associated with slavery 
and the hated Arab rulers of pre-revolutionary Zanzibar. 18  
Perhaps the best expression of this attitude was the conversion of the House of 
Wonders, a building that was built in the nineteenth century by Sultan Bargash that housed 
first the Omani then the British administration, into a museum of the revolution. In this 
museum, renamed the House of Remembrance, the path to the revolution was depicted as a 
march from slavery under the Arabs to freedom under the CCM.19 During this period, the 
Zanzibar Stone Town, the site of the economic activity that had linked Zanzibar to the Indian 
Ocean world, was allowed to crumble. The merchants who had owned the houses had either 
left or were compelled to share their homes with multiple families from the countryside.  
Zanzibar is an extreme case. But similar patterns followed in other East African 
countries. While most of the nativist sentiment was directed at South Asians, Arabs too were 
subject to economic discrimination and were seen as a threat to the creation of African 
nations. The 1960s and 1970s probably represent the low point of popular notions of western 
Indian Ocean unity. 
The Revival of “Basin Thinking” 
In 1978 Esmond and Chrysee Martin published Cargoes of the East, which is partly a history 
of the dhow trade and partly a travelogue of their research on the Indian Ocean rim. The 
following year, saw the publication of Oman, a Seafaring Nation by Esmond Martin and 
William Facey, a work that was published by the Omani government and which places Oman 
squarely in an Indian Ocean context. Its publication marks a transition in how people in 
Oman saw their place in the world. To be sure, the authors were not Omanis, or even Arabs, 
but their work was clearly supported and encouraged (and possibly even shaped) by the 
Omani Ministry of Information. In the Arab world the 1960s and 1970s had been a time 
when the governing ideology was, paralleling events in Africa, Arab nationalism, and Pan-
Arabism. Oman, a Seafaring Nation is nationalist (Oman’s centrality to Indian Ocean trade is 
heavily emphasized), but it also represents a desire to embrace Oman’s place in the 
multiethnic, multicultural world of the Indian Ocean.20  
                                                
18 Michael Lofchie, Background to Revolution (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965). 
19 Garth Andrew Meyers, Verandahs of Power: Colonialism and Space in Urban Africa (Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse University Press, 2003), 2–3. 
20 E.B. Martin and Chrysee Martin, Cargoes of the East (London: Elm Tree, 1978), and William Facey 
and E.B. Martin, Oman a Seafaring Nation (Muscat, Oman: Ministry of Information and Culture, Sultanate of 
Oman, 1979). 
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Oman then began to embrace the dhow as a symbol not of economic backwardness, 
but rather as symbol of the nation’s illustrious past. The government began to finance more 
research on dhows and other more visible uses of the dhow. The most dramatic of these was 
Tim Severin’s effort to sail a reconstruction of a twelfth-century sewn ship from Oman to 
China.21 The Omani government paid for this effort, and when Severin’s voyage was 
completed, the ship, called the Sindbad, was installed in the middle of a Muscat traffic circle. 
I was told by an American who has lived in Muscat for two decades that the installation was 
designed by people associated with Disney. The installation is an extreme case of “heritage 
kitsch.” The ship is in a pool of water and there are jets of water that spray up on the bows to 
make it appear to be in motion (Fig. 3).  
 
 
Figure 3.  The vessel Tim Severin sailed from Muscat to China, now in a traffic circle in 
Muscat. 
 
Other manifestations of the Omani interest in dhows can be seen in the harbor at 
Muttrah, where Sultan Qaboos keeps his yacht (Fig. 4). While it is a thoroughly modern 
vessel, built of fiberglass and featuring a host of electronics, including what appear to be self-
furling genoa sails, it is built to look like a bagala. It has lateen sails, a high and ornate stern, 
                                                
21 Tim Severin, The Sindbad Voyage (E. Rutherford, NJ: Arena, 1983). 
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and even what appears to be fake clinker-built planking on the hull. Clearly the Sultan felt his 
yacht should be comfortable and safe, but also embody Oman’s maritime heritage.  
 
 
Figure 4.  Sultan Qaboos’ yacht in Muttrah, Oman. 
 
In 2005 I was in Sur where I met Tom Vossmer, an Australian archaeologist. At the 
time he was working on the reconstruction of a reed boat based on the remains of a five-
thousand-year-old vessel he had found during an excavation in Oman (Fig. 5). This 
reconstruction was funded by the government of Oman. In the same yard where he was 
working another vessel was under construction. This was a huge motor dhow that was being 
built for use as a yacht by Sultan Qaboos. Unlike his current yacht, which was made in 
Europe, this one was built from wood in a local, traditional shipyard (Fig. 6). Other wealthy 
Omanis of lesser means have also built dhow/yachts, several examples of which were visible 
at yachting clubs in Muscat (Fig. 7).  In Muscat, the dhow has become a national symbol and 
an icon of Oman’s historical connections to a broader Indian Ocean world. 
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Figure 5.  Tom Vossmer’s reconstruction of a five thousand year-old reed hulled sailing 
ship in Sur, paid for in part by the Omani Goverenment. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Sultan Qaboos’ newer and more “traditional” yacht under construction in 
Sur. 
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Figure 7.  A dhow-yacht in Muttrah harbor. 
 
In East Africa the path to the acceptance and even promotion of dhows as heritage 
has been a bit rockier and ideologically more complex. Part of this has to do with the increase 
of tourism in the 1990s. While the Kenya coast has long been home to a tourism industry, 
Tanzania had little in the way of tourism on the coast until the 1990s. In the late 1980s the 
Zanzibar government had concluded that they needed to radically reform their economy. One 
path to this was to encourage tourism. Zanzibar had two things that might interest tourists: 
beaches and its historic Stone Town. Establishing the infrastructure for beach tourism was 
simple. It was merely a matter of expropriating land in the poorest and most powerless parts 
of the island and turning it over to European developers.  
The development of the Stone Town as a tourist area was more complicated. It 
involved the celebration of those chapters of Zanzibar’s past that the CCM and its 
constituents found most repellant. After all the great houses of the Stone Town were built by 
a merchant class that had either traded in slaves or in commodities grown by slaves and their 
descendants. Furthermore, the conservation plan that was devised for the city involved 
discouraging the use of certain building materials, especially concrete, in the restoration of 
older buildings and forbade the construction of some new buildings. Given that the Stone 
Town had fallen into such a state of disrepair in the quarter century since the revolution that 
most Zanzibaris considered living there a last resort, the notion of legislating against the 
modernization of the buildings seemed perverse. In effect, embracing the island’s Indian 
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Ocean heritage flew in the face of the CCMs African nationalism and their socialist notions 
of technological progress.22 
Further complicating the situation was the role of refugees returning from Oman in 
this process. Much of capital for the reconstruction of the Stone Town came from Zanzibaris 
who had fled the revolution but now wanted to reclaim and restore old family homes. Some 
of these returned Zanzibaris also bankrolled the construction of the first hotels and guest-
houses to cater the increasing numbers of tourists. So not only did heritage tourism require 
that the CCM celebrate the very things they had revolted against, it involved welcoming back 
people they saw as their enemies. 
Despite the misgivings of many in the CCM, the use of Zanzibar’s pre-revolutionary 
past in the tourist industry continued at a steadily increasing rate in the 1990s. Eventually this 
became a self-reinforcing cycle. As more Omanis returned to Zanzibar, first Gulf Air then 
Oman Air opened regular flights to the island. Many Zanzibari entrepreneurs began using 
these flights to get to Muscat and Dubai where they could buy consumer goods for resale in 
East Africa. Renewed contact with the Gulf revived popular ideas about the connections 
between the two regions, and Omani returnees to Zanzibar often employed dhow imagery in 
their businesses (Figs. 8, 9).  
 
Figure 8.  A reconstructed Mtepe, which is the centerpiece of the House of Wonders 
Museum in Zanzibar. 
                                                
22 The best accounts of the politics surrounding the conservation of the Stone Town are found in Abdul 
Sheriff, ed., History and Conservation of Zanzibar Stone Town (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1995). 
18     Erik Gilbert 
 
 
Figure 9.  A model of a bagala in the House of Wonders Museum. Many of these models 
were donated by benefactors from the Gulf.    
 
Perhaps the culmination of this process was the creation of the Zanzibar International 
Film Festival (ZIFF) in 1998. In the program for that year, Issa Mohamed Issa, Minister for 
Information, Culture, Tourism, and Youths, in Zanzibar wrote: 
The Zanzibar International Film Festival, which will present mostly films from the 
countries bordering the Indian Ocean, will reflect the various cultures that together 
made the hybrid Swahili culture of Eastern Africa and beyond. This is a unique 
cultural event, the first of its kind in the history of this region. This region never 
existed in terms of normalized institutions, though its people have come to form a 
large cultural group together over the millennium. 
The festival is not only providing us ‘dhow peoples’ a rare opportunity to 
view masterpieces of cinema from our diverse backgrounds …23 
This statement is followed by a “Message from the Matron” Zakhia Hamdani Megji, Minister 
of Tourism and Natural Resources. She is even more explicit in her sense that Zanzibar is 
part of an Indian Ocean world and that that world is symbolized by the dhow. 
                                                
23 Zanzibar International Film Festival, 1998 Program, p. 3. 
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[ZIFF is] the first anywhere to recognize the unique ties of Africa with our neighbors, 
the countries of the Indian Ocean basin. Together we form the ‘countries of the 
Dhow.’ 
 Our common economic and cultural heritage developed because of the 
seafarers of yesteryear, the sailors, the sailors of the Dhow.… We cannot deny the 
cosmopolitanism that forged our culture, that created our country, and that will lead 
us into the future.24 
One gets the sense from this that the Minister is grudgingly conceding that “basin thinking” 
is the future. 
The following year the event was renamed the “Festival of the Dhow Countries” and 
was expanded to include drama, dance, music, and visual arts in addition to film. The festival 
has grown and the organizers have put it on each year since 1998. If anything the use of the 
dhow as metaphor for the unity of region has increased. In the 2003 program we are told that 
The peoples from the Dhow Region are working for the integrated and sustained 
preservation of the Dhow Culture by creating a contemporary discourse on the 
region’s cultural heritage and its preservation. 
 By adopting the dhow as the festival’s symbol, ZIFF recognizes this ancient 
image as representing a collective culture and heritage to be celebrated.25  
 
Conclusion 
This is neither a complete study of notions about dhows in the western Indian Ocean nor a 
comprehensive survey of popular ideas about Indian Ocean unity. Rather it is narrowly 
focused on Zanzibar and to a lesser extent on Oman. However, the conclusions we can draw 
from this limited evidence are suggestive. The use of the term “dhow” by the Royal Navy as 
a collective term for vessels from the western Indian Ocean, suggests that imperialism did, as 
Karen Wigen suggests, nurture basin thinking with respect to the western Indian Ocean. The 
negative connotations that dhows carried in the nineteenth century because of their 
association with slavery continued into the twentieth century when first colonial governments 
and then postcolonial governments saw dhows as symbols of an archaic economy they 
wished to be rid of.  
The idea that dhows constitute cultural heritage, and a cultural heritage associated 
with a region (or in this case an oceanic basin) rather than a nation, seems to be quite recent. 
In the last twenty years dhows have been embraced by elites in the Gulf and East Africa as 
symbols of regional cultural coherence and by the tourism industry as something quaintly 
and exotically “historical.” This rethinking of dhows has occurred in the context of a growing 
tourism industry, globalization, and a rejection of the centrally planned economies that 
usually went hand in hand with nationalist postcolonial governments in Africa.  
                                                
24 Ibid., 5. 
25 Festival of the Dhow Countries, 2003 Program, p. 5. 
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